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Abstract. In April 2018, Beierle et al. launched the 3rd SKINNY crypt-
analysis competition, a contest that aimed at motivating the analysis
of their recent tweakable block cipher SKINNY. In contrary to the previ-
ous editions, the focus was made on practical attacks: contestants were
asked to recover a 128-bit secret key from a given set of 220 plaintext
blocks. The suggested SKINNY instances are 4- to 20-round reduced vari-
ants of SKINNY-64-128 and SKINNY-128-128. In this paper, we explain how
to solve the challenges for 10-round SKINNY-128-128 and for 12-round
SKINNY-64-128 in time equivalent to roughly 252 simple operations. Both
techniques benefit from the highly biased sets of messages that are pro-
vided and that actually correspond to the encryption of various books
in ECB mode.
Keywords: Cryptanalysis, SKINNY, Low Data attack, Truncated Differential,
Higher Order Differential, Integral Cryptanalysis
1 Introduction
In order to motivate external cryptanalyses of their family of ciphers, SKINNY
designers launched several one-year competitions. The first one started in 2016
and called for cryptanalyses of small-scaled variants of 18 up to 26 rounds of
SKINNY-64-128, and of 22 up to 30 rounds of SKINNY-128-128. The two papers
that won the competition are [1] for being the first submission that attacks up
to 20 rounds of SKINNY-64-128 and [9] for being the first submitted work to
successfully attack up to 23 rounds of SKINNY-64-128.
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The challenges launched in 2017 were similar, except that the number of
rounds one has to break were higher. Nobody won these contests.
The last competition started on the 1st of April 2018 and ended on February
28, 2019. This time, the goal was to mount a practical key recovery attack
of small-scaled versions of SKINNY for which sets of only 220 pairs (plaintext,
ciphertext) were provided. The designers offered rewards for the teams that
would break the maximum number of rounds for SKINNY-64-128 or SKINNY-128-
1285.
Contributions. In this paper, we describe our practical attacks on 12-round
SKINNY-64-128 and on 10-round SKINNY-128-128 in the setting of the third SKINNY
Cryptanalysis Competition. At the time of writing and as far as we know, these
attacks are the ones that cover the largest number of rounds.
Table 1. Complexities of our attacks: the data complexity corresponds to the number
of messages that are actually exploited in the attack, while time complexity is expressed
in number of basic operations.
Version Rounds Technique Data Time Memory
SKINNY-64-128 12 Truncated diff. 64 251.95 256 GB
SKINNY-128-128 10 2nd-order truncated diff. 24 252 0.5 GB
Paper Organization. After briefly recalling the description of the SKINNY block
cipher (Section 2), we study the structure of the provided set of 220 messages in
Section 3 and show that the observed bias comes from the fact that the plaintexts
are sentences of various famous books encrypted in ECB mode. We then describe
in Section 4 how we can benefit from this to find distinguishers that would not
have been possible if the input messages were uniformly distributed. More into
details, Section 5 reports a truncated differential attack that works with time
close to 252 operations. In this attack, a careful study of the tweakey schedule
showed that a 4-bit guess can be saved, while the key recovery algorithm is
optimised so that the required memory stays practical. In Section 6, we use
second-order truncated differentials to break 10-round SKINNY-128-128 with 252
basic operations.
The source codes of our attacks are available at
http://skinnysac19.gforge.inria.fr/
5 All the information on the competitions and on the cipher in general can be found
on https://sites.google.com/site/skinnycipher/home.
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2 A brief description of SKINNY
SKINNY is a family of lightweight tweakable block ciphers that was designed by
Beierle et al. and published at Crypto 2016 [3]. The objective pursued (and
achieved) by the designers was to propose a family of ciphers that would have
similar performances to those of the NSA cipher Simon [2] but with strong
security arguments on top.
The SKINNY ciphers follow the TWEAKEY framework from [6] so each in-
stance takes as input a plaintext P and a tweakey TK to produce a ciphertext C.
The different variants in the family are noted SKINNY-n-t, where n represents the
block size (64 or 128 bits) and where t is the tweakey size (n, 2n or 3n).
As for the AES and many other SPN, the internal state is organised in a
matrix of 4×4 elements. Depending on the block size, each cell is either a nibble
(4 bits, when n = 64) or a byte (8 bits, when n = 128). Similarly, the tweakey
is arranged in z = t/n such 4 × 4 matrices, noted TK1 up to TKz. Both the
messages and the tweakey states are loaded row-wise, and we number the nibbles
in this way (see Figure 8).
In the following we only provide a high-level description of SKINNY and refer
to the original specification [3] for further details.
Round function. SKINNY round function is illustrated in Figure 1. It can be
noted that contrary to most ciphers, the (tweak)key is added after the non-linear
operation (SubCells), and not before.
SC AC
ART
>>> 1
>>> 2
>>> 3
ShiftRows MixColumns
Fig. 1. SKINNY round function (figure credits: [5]).
Also, no whitening keys are used and the last MixColumns is not omitted,
which means that all the rounds iterate exactly the same sequence of operations,
that are:
– SubCells (SC): Each of the 16 cells of the internal state is modified by the
4 × 4 Sbox S4 described in Table 4 if each cell is a nibble, or by the 8 × 8
Sbox S8 described in Table 5 if each cell is a byte.
– AddConstants (AC): Constants generated by an LFSR are added in the first
3 cells of the first column.
– AddRoundTweakey (ART): The tweakey material is XORed to the first two
lines of the state.
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– ShiftRows (SR): The second, third and fourth rows of the internal state are
respectively right-rotated by 1 cell, 2 cells, and 3 cells.
– MixColumns (MC): Each input column of the internal state is multiplied by
the following binary matrix M :
M =

1 0 1 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0

The number of times the round function is repeated for each version of
SKINNY is detailed in Table 2.
Table 2. Number of iterated rounds for each version of the cipher, depending on the
tweakey size (t = z × n) and on the block size n.
Tweakey size
block size z = 1 z = 2 z = 3
n = 64 32 36 40
n = 128 40 48 56
Tweakey Schedule. SKINNY follows the Tweakey framework defined in [6] that
allows an user to add an additional parameter, the so-called tweak. In the setting
of the third cryptanalysis competition, the 128 bits of tweakey of SKINNY-64-128
or SKINNY-128-128 are unknown, and consequently the 128 bits are considered
as key only.
Extracted
8s-bit subtweakey
PT
LFSR
LFSR
Fig. 2. Tweakey schedule of SKINNY (figure credits: [5])
The tweakey schedule is represented in Figure 2. For SKINNY-128-128 there
is only one tweakey block (TK1) organised in a square matrix of bytes. At each
round, the first two lines of the matrix are extracted and used as round tweakey
in the step ART of the round function. Then, the bytes are permuted by the
permutation PT , given by:
PT = [9, 15, 8, 13, 10, 14, 12, 11, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7].
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This process is repeated for the following rounds.
In the case of SKINNY-64-128 we have z = 2, which means that we have
two tweakey states (TK1 and TK2) organised as 4 × 4 matrices of nibbles. A
round tweakey is made by extracting the first two rows of each tweakey state
and XORing them together. To produce the next tweakey, TK1 and TK2 are
first updated by applying the permutation PT that reorder their 16 nibbles. The
8 nibbles of the first two rows of TK2 are then further modified by the following
linear operation:
L : (x3||x2||x1||x0) 7→ (x2||x1||x0||x3 ⊕ x2)
where x0 is the LSB of the cell.
3 Remark on the Provided Messages
While looking for messages with specific patterns, we realized that the plaintexts
provided for the challenges were not uniformly distributed.
To illustrate this, we provide in Figure 3 the distribution of the value of
nibble 0 (top left corner in the Skinny internal state) and of nibble 15 (bottom
right) in the set provided for the 12-round attack on SKINNY-64-128.
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Fig. 3. Distribution of the value of nibble 0 (left) and of nibble 15 (right) of the 220
plaintexts provided for the 12-round attack on SKINNY-64-128.
In fact, the bias observed in Figure 3 is present on the other nibble positions
too, and we made the following observations:
– All the nibbles positioned at even indices (when considering the numbering
of Figure 8) have a distribution similar to the one of the left bar chart
of Figure 3: the most frequent value is 0x6 (occurring roughly half of the
time), followed by 0x7 and 0x2. The other values are very rare.
– The nibbles at odd positions don’t have such a strong bias. Still, some values
are more frequent than the others, like 0x0 that appears in one case out of 5.
5
It is rather direct to make the link between this distribution and the one
of a text in UTF-8 code: indeed, the first hint comes from the fact that the
UTF-8 code of the lower-case letters goes from 0x61 to 0x7a, which explains
the overwhelming occurrence of the nibble 0x6 (followed by the nibble 0x7) in
the distribution of nibbles at even positions. Also, a character that is ought to
appear frequently is the space, encoded by 0x20. This one explains the third
dominant higher nibble value (0x2) and the high number of occurrences of 0x0
in the lower nibbles.
This guess was confirmed once we printed the plaintexts. For instance, looking
at the messages given for the challenge on 4 rounds SKINNY-64-128, we read:
Project Gutenberg’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, by Lewis Carroll
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost
no restrictions whatsoever.
And few lines later, confirming that this is the book, one can read:
[...] when suddenly a White Rabbit with pink eyes ran close by her.
There was nothing so VERY remarkable in that; nor did Alice think it
so VERY much out of the way to hear the Rabbit say to itself, ‘Oh dear!
Oh dear! I shall be late!’
Other data sets correspond to other books (for instance Metamorphosis, by
Franz Kafka or The Prince, by Nicolo Machiavelli).
This high bias in the messages implies that we have some collisions on the
plaintext values. In the file provided for 12 rounds of SKINNY-64-128 we counted
925615 different pairs (219.82, so 216.90 collisions) out of the 220 provided. The
plaintext that appears the most corresponds to .” “ (dot (0x2e), closed quote
(0xe2809d), space (0x20), open quote (0xe2809c)) with 289 occurrences.
In the following, we detail how these biases work to our advantage by inducing
a set of messages with low entropy, helping us pushing further our attacks.
4 Mining Truncated Differentials in the Provided
Datasets
Any human-readable text has a low entropy and so does the book whose encryp-
tion was provided in the SKINNY 2018-2019 cryptanalysis competition. This fact
can be exploited by a cryptanalyst, who can devise attacks that would be ineffec-
tive in the classic known-plaintext scenario with uniformly distributed plaintexts.
In this section, we show that many pairs or even quadruples of plaintext blocks
can be found in the provided datasets for which particular (differential) zero-sum
properties hold with probability 1 after 6 rounds of SKINNY-64-128 and 7 rounds
of SKINNY-128-128.
We restrict our search to truncated differentials holding with probability 1.
Such distinguishers require only a few message pairs fitting them to provide
a strong filtering procedure for the key recovery. In addition to this, we also
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consider second-order differentials [8,7]: instead of studying the propagation of
differences between 2 messages as it is done with (first-order) differentials, we
look at the differences between a set of 22 messages. Note that finding such sets
of four distinct plaintext blocks that sum to zero has higher chances to happen
when these blocks differ only in a few cells. In our case, the low entropy of the
text facilitates such events.
4.1 Search Strategy
Our general search strategy is as follows. Instead of enumerating all possible
truncated differentials in the structure, we search precisely for those differentials
that fit the given set of plaintexts for any possible key. In order to find them,
we encrypt the plaintexts under several randomly chosen keys and search for
differential properties in the obtained ciphertexts. This empirical approach allows
tailoring the search to the given dataset.
Let P denote the set of provided plaintexts. We fix a SKINNY instance, a
number of rounds r in the target distinguisher, and a maximum number m (1 ≤
m ≤ 15) of active cells after the first round.
First, we compute all subsets of plaintexts such that all plaintexts inside any
such subset take the same value in at least 16−m cells, i.e. at most m cells are
active. In this step we exploit the fact that the first tweakey addition is done
after the non-linear operation and thus differences after the first round do not
depend on the key. In order to compute these subsets, we enumerate all possible
patterns of active cells and for each pattern we simply group the plaintexts by
the values of inactive cells.
We further process each such subset S ⊆ P as follows. We choose t random
keys k0, . . . , kt−1 and encrypt each plaintext p ∈ S using r-round SKINNY with
those keys. For each cell i of the output state, we record the vector vp,i of values
computed in that cell:
vp,i =
(
(Ek0(p))i, (Ek1(p))i, . . . , (Ekt−1(p))i
)
,
where Ek denotes r-round SKINNY encryption with the key k. Such vectors are
4t bits long in the case of SKINNY-64 and 8t bits long in the case of SKINNY-128.
Assume that we find a 2-vector collision, i.e. vp,i = vp′,i′ for some (p, i) 6=
(p′, i′). It is easy to see that i 6= i′ is unlikely because of the use of random keys.
Therefore, we obtain p 6= p′ and i = i′ and we conclude that the chosen SKINNY
instance with overwhelming probability has zero difference in cell i after r rounds
of encryption of plaintexts p and p′. By increasing t, the probability of error
can be made negligible. Furthermore, any such concrete truncated differential is
usually easy to verify.
If no 2-vector zero-sum occurred, we aim to find 4-vector zero-sums, which
would possibly lead to distinguishers on more rounds. This can be done in time
O(|S|2t) for each subset S ⊆ P by computing all pairwise vector differences and
finding a collision. More precisely, for each pair of elements vp,i, vp′,i′ ∈ S we
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add their difference vp,i ⊕ vp′,i′ to a hash table. A collision of such differences
means that we have found four vectors vp,i, vp′,i′ , vp′′,i′′ , vp′′′,i′′′ such that
vp,i ⊕ vp′,i′ ⊕ vp′′,i′′ ⊕ vp′′′,i′′′ = 0.
The converse is also true, i.e., any 4-vector zero-sum implies a difference collision
that this approach would find.
In practice, there are two cases that may happen:
1. the four vectors are vp,i, vp′,i, vp,i′ , vp′,i′ with p 6= p′, i 6= i′ (i.e. p = p′′, p′ =
p′′′, i = i′′′, i′ = i′′);
2. the four vectors are vp,i, vp′,i, vp′′,i, vp′′′,i with p, p′, p′′, p′′′ pairwise distinct
(i.e. i = i′ = i′′ = i′′′).
The first case corresponds to a truncated differential with input difference
∆p = p ⊕ p′ and the property that ∆ci = ∆ci′ , where ∆c = c ⊕ c′, c and c′
are ciphertexts corresponding to r-round SKINNY encryptions of plaintexts p and
p′. Such event may occur when the input difference of MixColumns has inactive
cells. For example,
MixColumn(δ, 0, 0, 0) = (0, δ, 0, δ)
for any cell difference δ.
The second case corresponds to the zero-sum property
ci ⊕ c′i ⊕ c′′i ⊕ c′′′i = 0,
where c, c′, c′′, c′′′ are ciphertexts corresponding to r-round SKINNY encryptions
of plaintexts p, p′, p′′, p′′′. This event usually requires that the plaintexts form a
second-order difference, i.e. they also sum to zero.
4.2 Truncated Distinguishers of SKINNY Instances
We applied this search strategy for the challenge datasets of 12-round SKINNY-
64-128 and 10-round SKINNY-128-128 with at most m = 3 active bytes after the
first round. The results are summarized in Table 3.
For 12-round SKINNY-64-128, we found distinguishers for up to 7 rounds and
only of the first type. For example, there are 57 pairs of plaintexts in the dataset
for which ∆c0 = ∆c12 after 7 rounds. An example of such plaintext pair (p, p′)
is given by
p = a pouch, ,
p′ = a pause, .
We use this distinguisher to attack 12-round SKINNY-64-128 and recover the
secret key. The process is described in Section 5.
For the 10-round SKINNY-128-128, we found distinguishers for up to 6 rounds
among which both distinguisher types are present. For example, there are 9
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Table 3. Truncated distinguishers with maximum number of rounds found using our
approach in the datasets of 12-round SKINNY-64-128 and 10-round SKINNY-128-128.
Bold font shows distinguishers used in our attacks.
Version Rounds/
Dataset
Rounds
Property #Plaintexts
in Structure
#Structures
in Dataset
SKINNY-64-128 7/12
∆c2 = ∆c14 2 76
∆c5 = ∆c13 2 76
∆c0 = ∆c12 2 57
∆c7 = ∆c15 2 57
∆c3 = ∆c15 2 50
∆c6 = ∆c14 2 50
∆c1 = ∆c13 2 22
∆c4 = ∆c12 2 22
SKINNY-128-128 6/10
∆c3 = ∆c15 2 12180
∆c6 = ∆c14 2 12093
∆c5 = ∆c13 2 2443
∆c2 = ∆c14 2 2412
∆c4 = ∆c12 2 600
∆c1 = ∆c13 2 598
∆c7 = ∆c15 2 430
∆c0 = ∆c12 2 413
∆c3 = ∆c7 2 16
∆c1 = ∆c5 2 11
∆c0 = ∆c4 2 8
∆c2 = ∆c6 2 1⊕
c9 = 0 4 9⊕
c10 = 0 4 7⊕
c8 = 0 4 5⊕
c11 = 0 4 1
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quadruples of plaintexts for which after 6 rounds of SKINNY-128-128 the cell
number 9 sums to zero. An example of such quadruple is given by
p = for a moment an ,
p′ = for a moment at ,
p′′ = for a moment in ,
p′′′ = for a moment it .
We use this distinguisher to recover the secret key of this SKINNY instance in
Section 6.
Figure 4 depicts one representative of each of the properties given in Table 3.
As can be seen in the table, each distinguisher has 3 other variants, corresponding
to its column rotations.
c0
c12
Property 1
∆c0 = ∆c12
c4
c12
Property 2
∆c4 = ∆c12
c0
c4
Property 3
∆c0 = ∆c4
⊕c8
Property 4
⊕c8 = 0
available for 7 rounds of Skinny-64-128
available for 6 rounds of Skinny-128-128
Fig. 4. Four properties found with our search strategy
5 Attacking 12-round SKINNY-64-128
5.1 Our Truncated Differential Trail
To attack 12 rounds, we use the truncated differential distinguisher described
in Section 4.2 which benefits from the not-so-uniform distribution of the provided
messages. As depicted in Figure 5, we consider a truncated differential path that
starts at round 2 with a difference of only one nibble, in X1[12]. After 6 rounds,
the first and last nibbles of the first column, denoted by "U1" and "U2" in the
figure, are always equal.
As already explained in Section 4, the fact that the first tweakey addition is
made after the non-linear layer makes the search for conforming pairs straight-
forward. For any pair, an attacker can compute the difference at the end of
round 1 to check if only X1[12] is active. If this condition is met, the rest of the
characteristic (up to X7) is fulfilled with probability 1.
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Fig. 5. Truncated differential trail used in our attack of SKINNY-64-128. The white cells
are inactive, the green ones are active for sure, while the yellow ones might be active.
If one pair of messages only differs on X1[12], the difference in the two nibbles X7[0]
and X7[12] (denoted U1 and U2) are equal with probability one.
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Once the attacker has determined the conforming pairs, she can deduce infor-
mation on the key by simply making guesses on the last round keys and checking
if she obtains equality between the differences in the nibbles X7[0] and X7[12].
5.2 From the Truncated Differential Path to the Attack: the Key
Recovery Part
The first step of our attack consists in exploring the set of 220 messages to
extract the pairs that comply with the start of the truncated differential path
(that are pairs with a single active nibble at the beginning of round 1, at X1[12]).
There are 57 such pairs6, which contrasts with what one would have obtain for
a uniformly distributed set (since the occurrence probability would have been
2−60).
Once this is done, an attacker makes key guesses to compute the differences
in X7[0] and X7[12] to check if they are equal. If they are not, the guessed key
is for sure incorrect, while if the equality is verified for all the considered pairs
the key guess might be the right one.
The key and state nibbles that need to be guessed are represented in Figure 7.
Out of the 19 tweakey nibbles that need to be guessed, 1 can be saved thanks
to the tweakey schedule relations:
Saving a nibble by taking into account the tweakey schedule. The
definition of the tweakey schedule of SKINNY implies that the round tweakeys
of all the even rounds (similarly of all the odd rounds) are related together by
linear relations. In the case of SKINNY-64-128, this might lead to a reduction in
the number of key guesses if we consider more than 4 consecutive rounds in the
key recovery.
To see how we can benefit from this in our attack, let us denote by xi (0 ≤
i ≤ 15) the nibbles of the first tweakey state (TK1) of tk7 and by yi (0 ≤ i ≤ 15)
the nibbles of its second tweakey state (TK2) (see Figure 6).
With these notations, tk7[0], tk9[2] and tk11[4] can be written as follows:
tk7[0] = x0 ⊕ y0
tk9[2] = x0 ⊕ L(y0)
tk11[4] = x0 ⊕ L(L(y0))
where L denotes one application of the linear operation (that can be seen as
a LFSR) defined in Section 2. If the attacker has already made a guess on the
values of tk9[2] and tk11[4], the previous relations imply that she can deduce the
value of tk7[0] by computing:
tk7[0] = L
−1(tk9[2]⊕ tk11[4])⊕ tk9[2] (1)
6 As seen previously, another possibility would have been to use the 76 pairs available
for the same trail shifted by 2 columns, that are starting with only one nibble active
at position 14 after 1 rounds and resulting into nibbles in position 2 and 14 that are
equal at the end of round 7 (see Table 3).
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tk7
x1 x2 x3
x7x6x5x4
x15x14x13x12
x8 x9 x10 x11
TK1
y1 y2 y3
y7y6y5y4
y15y14y13y12
y8 y9 y10 y11
TK2
x1
tk9
x7 x5
x3x4x6x2
x11x12x14x10
x9 x15 x8 x13
L(y1) L(y7) L(y5)
L(y3)L(y4)L(y6)L(y2)
L(y11)L(y12)L(y14)L(y10)
L(y9) L(y15) L(y8) L(y13)
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tk11
x3 x1 x6
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L(y0)
L2(y0)
x0
Fig. 6. Close up of the tweakey schedule in the final rounds.
Which induces a save of a 4-bit guess in the key recovery process.
Algorithmic Description of the Key Recovery. In addition to Figure 7,
we give in Algorithm 2 in Appendix a step by step description of the naive way
to implement the recovery of the round tweakeys involved in the computation of
U1 and U2. Quite naturally, the key recovery is organised so that the key nibbles
that are required to compute both U1 and U2 are guessed first. Then, one part
of the algorithm is dedicated to the guess of the remaining key nibbles required
to obtain U1 and another one, independently, deals with U2. Remember that the
numbering of the state nibbles that is used is the one of Figure 8.
Note that we don’t give the tedious details of how the nibbles are computed,
as we consider that this is rather obvious from the cipher description. Indeed, as
per usual in key recovery algorithms, the operations consist in decrypting par-
tially from the ciphertext, nibble after nibble, for the positions that are required
to get U1 and U2. Just to give an example, X11[7] is obtained by computing
X11[7] = S−14 (Z11[7]⊕ tk11[7]).
In the naive version of Algorithm 2, T1 (respectively T2) contains 244 lines
composed of the 32 computed values of U1 (resp. U2) concatenated to the tweakey
guess of 11 nibbles. To reduce this huge memory requirement we exploit further
the fact that U1 and U2 both depend on tk11[7], tk10[6], tk11[3] and tk9[2].
The idea consists in going over all the possible values of the 4 common nibbles,
and to repeat the building of the two tables once the values of these 4 are fixed (so
without storing them in the tables). This optimisation (and others) are presented
in Algorithm 1.
In this way, the two tables V1 and V2 contain 228 rows. Each row is made
of 4 × 24 = 64 bits (corresponding to the computed nibble of difference U1 or
U2 for all the 24 input pairs). In this first step, we don’t keep track of the value
of the other tweakey nibbles in order to reduce memory as far as possible. The
goal is only to get a reduced set of possibilities for the 4 nibbles tk11[7], tk10[6],
tk11[3] and tk9[2]. Once this is done, a second iteration gives the desired result.
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Fig. 7. Nibble dependencies in the key recovery process. We want to recover the differ-
ence U1 and U2. To compute U1 from a pair of ciphertexts we need the value of the blue
nibbles of the internal state and of the blue nibble of the round tweakeys. Similarly,
the pink nibbles are required to recover the difference U2. The numbers correspond to
the order in which is done the key guessing: we start by the nibbles that are needed
for both U1 and U2. The round tweakey nibble denoted by F comes for free if tk11[4]
and tk9[2] are known, which is why we mark tk9[2] as required for both U1 and U2.
The second iteration takes as parameter the value of the previous match so that
the filtering is quicker. Matching on these at the second iterations means we are
considering the same value for the other nibbles of key guesses.
14

0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15

Fig. 8. Numbering of the nibbles in the internal state.
Similarly to the naive algorithm, building each table requires to guess 244
bits. Once V1 and V2 are filled, they are sorted7. We then merge the two tables
on the 24 4-bit values of U1 and U2: the probability of a match is equal to 2−64,
which implies that 216 × 228+28−64 = 216 × 2−8 values of the 4 tweakey nibbles
tk11[7], tk10[6], tk11[3] and tk9[2] survive this filter.
To decide on which of these is correct, we repeat the previous process for the
same 24 pairs plus 24 new ones for the 28 surviving values (this time we keep
track of all the guessed values in tk11). Only one value of tk11 passes the test.
In this optimised version, we focus on recovering tk11 only. To recover the
other round tweakeys, the attacker peels off the last round by using tk11 and
launches a similar and faster attack on 11-round SKINNY, and so on until the
master key can be recovered.
Total Complexity. The complexity of the key recovery is dominated by the cost
of recovering tk11, that can be decomposed as follows:
216 × ( 2× 32× 228︸ ︷︷ ︸
filling V1 and V2
+ 2× 28× 228︸ ︷︷ ︸
sorting V1 and V2
+2−8 × 2× 64× 228︸ ︷︷ ︸
filling for the 32 pairs
)
which is equal to 251.95 operations.
The memory complexity is dominated by the space required to store V1 and
V2. Since each table contains 228 rows of 64 bits, each core stores 228×64×2 = 235
bits. The 64 cores store a total of 241 bits, which are 256 GB.
5.3 Details on the Practical Execution of the Attack
The program was written in C++ and it was executed on 64 cores clocked at
2,10Ghz on an Intel Xeon CPU E5-2695. The result of Algorithm 1 was returned
after less than 2 days (a total of 114 CPU days). As said previously 256 GB of
memory were required.
Implementation choices. The time complexity of the attack being around
252 simple operations we needed to optimize the implementation. We made two
main choices:
7 Sorting a table of n elements requires roughly n logn operation so we consider that
the complexity of this step is equal to 28× 228.
15
Algorithm 1: Improved recovery of tk11
Input: 25 pairs of messages following the truncated differential path
Output: Last round tweakey tk11.
for tk11[7]← 0 to f do
for tk10[6]← 0 to f do
for tk11[3]← 0 to f do
for tk9[2]← 0 to f do
Initialise a table V2
for all possible values of tk11[0], tk11[5], tk10[1], tk10[4], tk11[6],
tk9[7] and tk8[3] do
compute the difference in X7[12] for the first 24 pairs and
store it in V2
end
Initialise a table V1
for all possible values of tk11[4], tk10[0], tk10[7], tk11[2], tk11[1],
tk9[5] and tk8[4] do
compute the difference in X7[0] for the first 24 pairs and
store it in V1
end
Sort V1 and V2
Merge V1 and V2 on the 24 values of X7[12] and X7[0]
if the intersection is not empty then
repeat the algorithm for 25 pairs (the same 24 plus 24 new),
passing the matching value as parameter
only one guess of tk11 survives, return this one
else
the guess for tk11[7], tk10[6], tk11[3] and tk9[2] is incorrect
end
end
end
end
end
1. It is possible to decrease the memory requirement to only 27×4×64 = 234 bits
by making the code parallel only once the 4 nibbles tk9[2], tk10[6], tk11[3]
and tk11[7] are set. However, we found experimentally that this is much
slower than making the whole code parallel. Indeed, filling Vi requires only
2×32×228 = 234 simple operations and using 64 cores for this is not worth.
2. It seems possible to save some time complexity by using an hash table in-
stead of two sorted arrays. While this is true in theory, in practice we found
the sorted arrays to be much faster. The main reason is the non-sequential
accesses to the hash table, which are likely to lead to a cache miss at each
access due to its size.
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Once we have the full round tweakey tk11 we decrypt the last round and
launch a similar attack on 11 rounds (with complexities that are negligible in
comparison to the 12-round one) an so on until the master key is recovered.
5.4 On the Choice of the Distinguisher
As detailed in Section 3, another distinguisher is available over 7 rounds of
SKINNY-64-128, corresponding to the equality of the difference in one nibble of the
second row with the difference in the nibble in the last row and same column (see
Property 2 in Figure 4). However, this option would have lead to an heavier key-
recovery step as more nibbles of the key need to be guessed to obtain the required
differences at the end of the distinguisher. More generally, our attack scenario
can be played with different parameters as one can change the active nibble of
the truncated characteristic and/or nibbles involved in the distinguisher. Hence
we used the tool devised in the Crypto 16 article Automatic Search of Meet-in-
the-Middle and Impossible Differential Attacks by Patrick Derbez and Pierre-
Alain Fouque [4] to exhaust all cases and keep the one leading to the smallest
complexity.
6 Attacking 10-round SKINNY-128-128
In Section 4, we found 9 structures of 4 plaintexts each such that the cell number
9 sums to zero over the 6-round SKINNY-128-128 encryptions of those plaintexts.
These quadruples of plaintexts differ in two bytes and sum to zero. In other
words, these quadruples form a second-order difference with two active bytes and
the described distinguisher is a second-order truncated differential distinguisher8
(see [8,7]). This distinguisher can be defined for arbitrary differences α, β ∈ F82
as 
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 α 0
⊗

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 β
 6 rounds−−−−−→

? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? B ? ?
? ? ? ?
,
where ⊗ means that the second-order differential is formed by the two operands
as the basis, B means that the cell sums to zero and ? means that the sum is un-
specified. That is, the last two bytes must have differences (0, 0), (α, 0), (0, β), (α, β)
from one of the plaintexts in the quadruple, for any α, β ∈ F82. A graphical rep-
resentation of the truncated path of this distinguisher is given in Figure 9.
6.1 Key-Recovery using Truncated Differentials
The key recovery step is rather straightforward. The cell number 9 after 6 rounds
of SKINNY-128-128, denoted X6[9], can be computed from the 10-round cipher-
text using only 6 bytes of the key. Let I denote the inverse of the SKINNY-128
8 Such distinguishers are also called integral distinguishers.
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Fig. 9. Distinguisher on 6 rounds used in the 10-round attack on SKINNY-128-128.
S-Box, C ∈ (F82)16 denote the ciphertext and k ∈ (F82)16 denote the master key.
Then
X6[9] = I(I(k12 ⊕ a⊕ b⊕ c)⊕ I(d⊕ e)), where
a = I(3⊕ k7 ⊕ I(k9 ⊕ C6 ⊕ C10 ⊕ C14)⊕ I(C7 ⊕ C15)⊕ I(C0 ⊕ C12)),
b = I(2⊕ I(k15 ⊕ C7 ⊕ C11 ⊕ C15)⊕ I(C1 ⊕ C13)),
c = I(I(k8 ⊕ C7)⊕ I(C2 ⊕ C14)),
d = I(k3 ⊕ I(k15 ⊕ C7 ⊕ C11 ⊕ C15)),
e = I(I(k12 ⊕ C5)⊕ I(C0 ⊕ C12)).
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It follows that X6[9] depends only on 6 key bytes:
k3, k7, k8, k9, k12, k15.
As can be seen in Figure 10, we again benefit from the tweakey schedule as
the tweakey byte required in tk7 is equal to one of the 4 bytes guessed in tk9,
namely the byte k12 of the master key.
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Fig. 10. Key recovery step used in the 10-round attack on SKINNY-128-128.
It is enough to consider 6 out of 9 quadruples following the trail in order to
obtain a filter of probability 2−48. Then, the 6 involved bytes of the key can be
found by exhaustive search. The check consists in computation of X6[9] from
ciphertexts using the equation above and verifying that the sum is equal to zero.
The rest of the key can be recovered in a similar way, but with complexity
negligible compared to the main attack.
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6.2 Details on the Practical Execution of the Attack
We implemented the attack in C language and executed it on 8 cores of an Intel
Xeon CPU E5-2637 clocked at 3.50GHz. It exhausted the search space in 4 days
(at total of 32 CPU days) and successfully determined the right key.
In the implementation, we performed the following optimisation. The com-
putation of X6[9] can be structured as a sequence of four table lookups of size at
most 224 with negligible precomputation time and less than 6× 4× 224 bytes of
extra memory. For each ciphertext C, we precompute mappings t1, t2, t4 : F242 →
F82, t3 : F162 → F82 such that X6[9] can be computed from the master key bytes
k7, k8, k9, k3, k12, k15 as follows:
t1 = t1(k7, k8, k9) = a⊕ c,
t2 = t2(k3, k12, k15) = I(d⊕ e),
t3 = t3(k12, k15) = k12 ⊕ b,
t4 = t4(t1, t2, t3) = I(I(t1 ⊕ t3)⊕ t2),
X6[9] = t4.
The final complexity of the attack is dominated by verifying the zero-sum
property for one of the quadruples, which requires 4 computations of X6[9], i.e.
16 24-bit table lookups. The total complexity is thus 252 table lookups. The
memory complexity is equal to (2 × 6 + 1) × 224 + 6 × 216 bytes ≈ 208 MB
(note that t4 does not depend on the ciphertext) and can be further reduced if
necessary.
6.3 On the Choice of the Distinguisher
We remark that choosing another distinguishers from Table 3 would lead to
similar or higher complexities.
The properties
⊕
ci for 8 ≤ i ≤ 11 are equivalent in the sense that corre-
sponding cells ci can be computed from the ciphertext using only 6 key bytes.
However, for the case i = 9 there are more structures in the provided data set.
All properties ∆ci = ∆cj from Table 3 lead to similar or higher time com-
plexity of the key recovery. Indeed, for each of these properties at least one
of the two cells ci, cj requires at least 6 key bytes to be guessed to compute
the corresponding difference. For example, consider the property ∆c0 = ∆c12
after 6 rounds (similar to the 7-round distinguisher used to attack SKINNY-
64-128). The cell c0 can be computed from the ciphertext using 5 key bytes
k0, k3, k10, k14, k15; the cell c12 can be computed from the ciphertext using 6
key bytes k3, k4, k10, k11, k12, k15. The attacker first guesses 3 common key bytes
k3, k10, k15. Then she enumerates all values of k0, k14, computes the differences
∆c0 and puts them in a table. Finally, she enumerates all values of k4, k11, k12,
computes the differences ∆c12 and checks if they are in the table. This approach
requires O(248) time and O(216) memory.
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7 Conclusion
In this cryptanalysis report we detailed practical key recovery attacks of 12-
round SKINNY-64-128 and 10-round SKINNY-128-128 from given sets of 220 mes-
sages. Our attacks consist in leveraging a distinguisher based on a probability-1
truncated first-order and second-order differential paths. The attacks are possi-
ble because the provided sets of messages give much more exploitable pairs than
what one could have expected from a random set.
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Appendix
Table 4. 4-bit Sbox used in SKINNY-64.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
S4(x) c 6 9 0 1 a 2 b 3 8 5 d 4 e 7 f
Table 5. 8-bit Sbox used in SKINNY-128.
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
00 65 4c 6a 42 4b 63 43 6b 55 75 5a 7a 53 73 5b 7b
10 35 8c 3a 81 89 33 80 3b 95 25 98 2a 90 23 99 2b
20 e5 cc e8 c1 c9 e0 c0 e9 d5 f5 d8 f8 d0 f0 d9 f9
30 a5 1c a8 12 1b a0 13 a9 05 b5 0a b8 03 b0 0b b9
40 32 88 3c 85 8d 34 84 3d 91 22 9c 2c 94 24 9d 2d
50 62 4a 6c 45 4d 64 44 6d 52 72 5c 7c 54 74 5d 7d
60 a1 1a ac 15 1d a4 14 ad 02 b1 0c bc 04 b4 0d bd
70 e1 c8 ec c5 cd e4 c4 ed d1 f1 dc fc d4 f4 dd fd
80 36 8e 38 82 8b 30 83 39 96 26 9a 28 93 20 9b 29
90 66 4e 68 41 49 60 40 69 56 76 58 78 50 70 59 79
a0 a6 1e aa 11 19 a3 10 ab 06 b6 08 ba 00 b3 09 bb
b0 e6 ce ea c2 cb e3 c3 eb d6 f6 da fa d3 f3 db fb
c0 31 8a 3e 86 8f 37 87 3f 92 21 9e 2e 97 27 9f 2f
d0 61 48 6e 46 4f 67 47 6f 51 71 5e 7e 57 77 5f 7f
e0 a2 18 ae 16 1f a7 17 af 01 b2 0e be 07 b7 0f bf
f0 e2 ca ee c6 cf e7 c7 ef d2 f2 de fe d7 f7 df ff
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Algorithm 2: Recovery of the tweakey nibbles involved in the computation
of U1 andU2
Input: Pairs of messages following the truncated differential path
Output: Last round tweakey tk11, nibbles 0, 1, 4, 6 and 7 of tk10, nibbles 2, 5 and 7 of tk9,
nibbles 3 and 4 of tk8 (and 0 of tk7).
Initialise two tables T1 and T2 and compute X11[8− 15] and Z11[0− 7] from the ciphertexts
for tk11[7]← 0 to f do
compute X11[7]
for tk10[6]← 0 to f do
for tk11[3]← 0 to f do
compute X10[6], X11[3] and X10[12]
for tk9[2]← 0 to f do
compute X9[2]
for tk11[0]← 0 to f do
compute X11[0] and X10[13]
for tk11[5]← 0 to f do
compute X11[5]
for tk10[1]← 0 to f do
compute X10[1], X9[14] and X8[15]
for tk10[4]← 0 to f do
compute X10[4]
for tk11[6]← 0 to f do
compute X11[6] and X10[8]
for tk9[7]← 0 to f do
compute X9[7]
for tk8[3]← 0 to f do
compute the difference in X7[12] for all the
pairs and store it in T2 next to the key
guesses
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
for tk11[4]← 0 to f do
compute tk7[0] by using Equation (1)
compute X11[4] and X10[10]
for tk10[0]← 0 to f do
compute X10[0] and X9[13]
for tk10[7]← 0 to f do
compute X10[7]
for tk11[2]← 0 to f do
compute X11[2], X10[15] and X9[9]
for tk11[1]← 0 to f do
compute X11[1] and X10[14]
for tk9[5]← 0 to f do
for tk8[4]← 0 to f do
compute the difference in X7[0] for all the
pairs and store it in T1 next to the key
guesses
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
Merge T1 and T2 and return the corresponding keys
end
end
end
end
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